三、“博弈邊界”的缺失與中美關係的未來
綜合而言，拜登政府雖以“競合”框架統領美國對華戰略，但在全面對華施壓思維的預設下，競爭成為主調，合作相對乏力。這也導致中美兩國難以對特朗普政府時期雙邊關係中的分歧領域進行修復和調整。這種分歧在經貿科技領域體現得尤為明顯，在雙邊存在爭議的領域以及地區安全問題上的博弈仍在持續。與此同時，中美戰略競爭中的意識形態因素進一步增加，中美關係的軟環境不容樂觀。
在美國政府與國會的遏壓慣性下，中美關係的“緩衝區”越來越小，摩擦的烈度逐步增加，甚至出現爆發衝突乃至戰爭的可能性。儘管中美元首會晤為雙邊關係緩和奠定了重要契機，但“氣球事件”後布林肯取消訪華議程，中美之間的溝通渠道僅限在慕尼黑的非正式交談，雙方僅餘重複強調己方立場、難以撼動對方立場。在短期內，中美關係再難以發生質的改變，雙方在各個領域的鬥爭對峙將持續強化，并為雙邊關係帶來難以預估的風險。
儘管拜登政府承諾不打“新冷戰”，但兩國政界和學界仍對於缺乏有效管控的中美關係的發展感到擔憂。2021年11月11日，美國國家安全顧問沙利文在澳大利亞智庫洛伊國際政策研究所（Lowy Institute）舉辦的綫上論壇中指出，美國一直都是“印太常駐大國”，但他也再度重申了“中美共存”的觀點，認為中美兩國擁有合作空間，“激烈競爭并非一定會釀成衝突”。〔21〕但對於中美如何開展合作、合作的模式和限度是什麼等問題，拜登政策團隊至今未給出明確的答案。
正如美國戰略與國際研究中心高級研究員白明（Jude Blancette）所述，“避免災難是對棘手的中美關係真正的考驗”〔22〕。中美之間的“穩定舵”和“安全閥”遲遲難以建立，“博弈邊界”極度模糊，意味著雙方將在未來的互動中時常面對超出預期和掌控的局勢。目前看來，拜登治下的美國短期內仍難以克服陷入分裂和彼此攻訐的國內政治，而反中情緒則是兩黨極少數的共同點之一，這也決定了“對華強硬”的政治戲碼會在華盛頓內部輪番上映。受制於共和黨和右翼勢力的壓力，拜登政府繼續順應著既有的戰略慣性。“氣球事件”裡美國各方力量爭先對華“秀肌肉”并將拜登政府步步推向強勢遏壓，即是這一狀態的集中寫照。
兩國之間的互動為雙方矛盾和爭端所主導，中美之間的戰略競爭將朝向“常態化”發展。考慮到中美兩國在雙邊、地區和全球層面均存在許多共同利益，這種趨勢不僅不符合兩國利益，而且也將會為國際社會帶來風險及不確定性。在用以支撑雙邊關係發展以及分歧管控的政策框架難以重新建立的背景下，中美關係的重構與發展將面臨更大的挑戰。
註釋：
〔1〕The White House, “Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World,” February 4, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world/.
〔2〕The White House, “Interim National Security Strategy Guidance,” March 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
〔3〕Vivian Salama and Gordon Lubold, “Biden Says He Sees China as ‘Stiff Competition’,” The Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/biden-press-conference-live-updates-analysis/card/ifirn5yjOObkp0pm2Lzv.
〔4〕The White House, “Remarks by President Biden Before the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” September 21, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/09/21/remarks-by-president-biden-before-the-76th-session-of-the-united-nations-general-assembly/.
〔5〕U.S. Department of State, “A Foreign Policy for the American People,” March 3, 2021, https://www.state.gov/a-foreign-policy-for-the-american-people/.
〔6〕U.S. Department of State, “Deputy Secretary Sherman’s Visit to the People’s Republic of China,” July 26, 2021, https://www.state.gov/deputy-secretary-shermans-visit-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/.
〔7〕The White House, “Readout of National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s Meeting with Politburo Member Yang Jiechi,” October 6, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/10/06/readout-of-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivans-meeting-with-politburo-member-yang-jiechi/.
〔8〕U.S. Department of State, “The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China,” May 26, 2022, https://www.state.gov/the-administrations-approach-to-the-peoples-republic-of-china/.
〔9〕The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States,” February 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf.
〔10〕The White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States,” October 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf.
〔11〕U.S. Department of Defense, “2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America,” October 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.
〔12〕U.S. Department of State, “Secretary Blinken Launches the Office of China Coordination,” December 16, 2022, https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinken-launches-the-office-of-china-coordination/.
〔13〕樊吉社：《美國對華決策:機制調整與團隊轉換》，載《當代美國評論》2021年第4期，第14-18頁。
〔14〕中華人民共和國外交部，“習近平同美國總統拜登在巴厘島舉行會晤”，2022年11月14日，https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zyxw/202211/t20221114_10974651.shtml.
〔15〕U.S. Department of State, “New Guidelines for U.S. Government Interactions with Taiwan Counterparts,” April 9, 2021, https://www.state.gov/new-guidelines-for-u-s-government-interactions-with-taiwan-counterparts/.
〔16〕“President Biden on Taiwan,” CBS, September 18, 2022, https://www.cbsnews.com/video/president-biden-on-taiwan-60-minutes/#x.
〔17〕Craig Singleton, “How Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan Gambit Backfired,” Foreign Policy, August 16, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/16/taiwan-pelosi-china-military-conflict-east-asia-missiles/.
〔18〕“Senator Markey Leads Bipartisan Delegation to Taiwan, Reaffirms Importance of Peace and Partnership,” August 15, 2022, https://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senator-markey-leads-bipartisan-delegation-to-taiwan-reaffirmsimportance-of-peace-and-partnership.
〔19〕U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, “Taiwan in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 2023,” https://www.ustaiwandefense.com/taiwan-in-the-national-defense-authorization-act-ndaa-2023/.
〔20〕The White House, “FACT SHEET: CHIPS and Science Act Will Lower Costs, Create Jobs, Strengthen Supply Chains, and Counter China,” August 9, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/08/09/fact-sheet-chips-and-science-act-will-lower-costs-create-jobs-strengthen-supply-chains-and-counter-china/.
〔21〕Jake Sullivan, “2021 Lowy Lecture,” Lowy Institute, November 11, 2021, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/2021-lowy-lecture-jake-sullivan.
〔22〕Jude Blanchette, “Avoiding catastrophe will be the true test of fractious US-China relations,” Financial Times, February 11, 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/f794b181-b774-40d4-a763-5f41024d9afe.
（全文刊載於《中國評論》月刊2023年4月號，總第304期） |
